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NOTE
MIND THE GAP: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH FOR FIXING VOLCKER,
LEARNING FROM LIIKANEN, AND
USING VICKERS TO REPAIR THE
U.S. BANKING SYSTEM
RACHEL SEREIX*

INTRODUCTION
Mention of the “London Whale”1—a moniker for Bruno Iksil—still
stirs the inflamed passions of regulators throughout the United States
and the United Kingdom.2 Prosecutors, frustrated by their futile
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1. The “London Whale” refers to Bruno Iksil himself. The associated trading scandal has
likewise been termed “the London Whale trading scandal” or even just the “London Whale.” The
eponymous scandal involved hedging—a practice which marks positions in a credit derivatives
portfolio at inflated prices. See Patricia Hurtado, The London Whale, BLOOMBERG (February 23,
2016, 5:04 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/the-london-whale (describing the London
Whale’s scheme broadly and defining the key players involved in the scandal).
2. For further expression of regulators’ angst over Iksil and Martin-Artajo’s mess, look no
further then Thomas Curry, Scott Waterhouse, and Michael Sullivan’s question and answer
session during the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations’ Hearing entitled “J.P. Morgan
Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks & Abuses,” wherein the Office of the
Comptroller (OCC) was humiliated by three senators with minimal finance training—telling the
subcommittee that they were surprised by stories of illicit derivatives swaps and kept deferring to
J.P. Morgan for more information. See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG.,
REP. ON J.P. MORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND
ABUSES 216 (Comm. Print 2013) [hereinafter DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES]. When
questioned about exactly which OCC examiner was tasked with overseeing J.P. Morgan’s Chief
Investment Office, the OCC advised the subcommittee that the examiner “was then on vacation,
[and] his subordinates failed to notice the size of the loss and no one made any call to the bank to
ask about it.” Id. at 242–243; see also Gregg Fields, Whale-Sized Institutional Corruption:
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attempts to extradite several J.P. Morgan desk traders, engaged in four
years of criminal litigation to no avail.3 These desk traders—Bruno Iksil
and three of his colleagues—all worked in the Chief Investment Office
(CIO) at J.P. Morgan—and managed in excess of $350 billion deposits
at the UK trading desk.4 Martin Artajo and Iksil, the rogue traders
housed within J.P. Morgan’s Chief Investment Office, worked on the
bank’s synthetic credit portfolio—a mere guise for hedging.5 Due to the
irresponsible maneuvers of CIO members, J.P. Morgan absorbed the
losses imposed by these rogue traders.6 In 2012, world credit markets
fared one of the worst losses in history—squandering $6.2 billion
dollars due to a series of proprietary trades executed by rogue traders.7
These trading behaviors were not isolated to J.P. Morgan—they were
ubiquitous at nearly every systematically important financial
institution (SIFI) leading up to the financial crisis of 2008.8 Central to
this “tempest in a teapot”9 were these four J.P. Morgan traders whose
illicit corporate behavior attracted the attention of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and an international audience. A series of
recorded phone calls and instant messages between the group of desk

Regulatory Capture and the JP Morgan Derivatives Scandal, HARVARD UNIVERSITY EDMOND J.
SAFRA CENTER FOR ETHICS (Mar. 29, 2013), https://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/whale-sizedinstitutional-corruption (describing the Senate Permanent Subcommittee report’s condemnation
of J.P. Morgan’s practices).
3. See Acting U.S. Attorney Announces Filing of Motion to Dismiss Pending Charges in
United States v. Javier Martin-Artajo and Julien Grout, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF. S.
DIST. OF N.Y. (July 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/acting-us-attorneyannounces-filing-motion-dismiss-pending-charges-united-states-v (noting that two former traders
were first indicted in 2013 in the office’s announcement of intent to dismiss charges in 2017).
Prosecutors seeking charges against Iksil and company found that, “[b]ased on a review of recent
statements and writings made by Iksil, however, the Government no longer believe[d] that it
[could] rely on the testimony of Iksil in prosecuting this case, even if the defendants
appeared. Based on these developments, among other factors, the Government . . . decided not
to keep these charges pending, but rather to seek their dismissal at this time.” Id.
4. See DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES, supra note 2, at 1, 3–4.
5. Id. at 1.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 219 (“The OCC also initiated a review to determine whether similarly risky
activities were being conducted in the asset management functions at other banks, but found ‘no
activity similar to the scale or complexity’ of the credit derivatives trading that took place at J.P.
Morgan Chase.”); see also Vinãls SDN, infra note 103, at 12 (noting that in an empirical study
examining the roots of the financial crisis, the results suggested that leverage and liquidity, rather
than business model, were the key risk factors contributing to bank failure).
9. Nathan Vardi, Jamie Dimon’s Five Stages of Grief, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2013, 11:02 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2013/04/11/jamie-dimons-five-stages-ofgrief/?sh=2968d0c47563 (quoting Polya Lesova, Dimon: London Whale Issues “Tempest in a
Teapot”, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/dimon-londonwhale-issues-tempest-in-a-teapot-2012-04-13-937450).
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traders perhaps best illustrates the magnitude of the traders’ illegal
speculative activities.10
“I can’t hold on anymore to this thing.” . . . “I don’t know where
he wants to stop . . . but it’s becoming idiotic . . . [N]ow it’s worse
than before . . . there’s nothing that can be done, absolutely
nothing that can be done, there’s no hope . . . The book
continues to grow, more and more monstrous.”11

By mismarking their Synthetic Credit Portfolio book to hide
hundreds of millions of dollars in losses, employing manipulating
models, and misinforming investors, regulators, and the public, Iksil and
his colleagues engaged in high-risk behaviors hidden from federal
comptrollers and from their superiors within J.P. Morgan.12 J.P.
Morgan’s London Whale scheme highlights the need to increase
oversight of individual trading activities and specifically derivatives
trading.13
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act14 tried to solve the
problem by reducing derivatives-related risk through legislative
provisions that increased capital and liquidity requirements for all
banks.15 Likewise, the Act introduced a series of compliance and

10. See DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES, supra note 2, at 14 (“Recorded telephone calls,
instant messages, and the Grout spreadsheet disclosed how the traders booking the derivative
values felt pressured and were upset about mismarking the book to minimize losses.”).
11. Instant message from Bruno Iksil, Chief Investment Office at J.P. Morgan (Mar. 23,
2012) (on file with author); see also Instant message from Bruno Iksil, Chief Investment Office at
J.P. Morgan (Mar. 23, 2012) (on file with author) Iksil clearly indicated that he knew his claim
that the synthetic credit portfolio had become “too big for the market” would garner little
sympathy, writing “I am going to be hauled over the coals. . .you don’t lose 500M without
consequences.” DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES, supra note 2, at 83, 59. Iksil’s mysterious
“book” refers to J.P. Morgan’s Synthetic Credit Portfolio trading book. While some “books”
contain a compilation of equities, debts, commodities, and derivatives, the book referred to
contained only derivatives managed by Iksil and his team. By manipulating the value of “the
book,” Iksil impressed his superiors by inflating derivatives earnings beyond the $500 million
dollars to a whopping 1.05 billion dollars—only to lead his employer, J.P. Morgan, to incur $6.3
billion in losses.
12. See Jill E. Fisch, The Mess at Morgan: Risk, Incentives and Shareholder Empowerment,
83 U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 656 (2015) (describing how JP Morgan attempted to hide the London
Whale’s trading loses).
13. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Derivatives: A Fundamental Rethinking, Harvard
Law
School
Forum
on
Corporate
Governance
(Feb.
11,
2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/11/regulating-derivatives-a-fundamental-rethinking/
(noting that credit default swaps “that have one or more systemically important counterparties
should be regulated”).
14. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
15. Id. (Imposing further regulatory restraints upon OTC derivatives, under the
synonymous term “swaps,” in Title VII of the Act).
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whistleblower incentives.16 Yet, banks continued to find means to
subvert the system and Congress remained relatively silent on the issue
after the passage of Dodd-Frank—failing to amend Dodd-Frank in any
meaningful way.17 Perhaps the Dodd-Frank Act’s “Volcker Rule” has
beguiled lawmakers who initially intended to prevent future major
economic collapse.18 Looking towards European peers for guidance
about how to reform the United States’ banking regime has often been
discussed but rarely embraced by legislatures.19 After all, the Volcker
Rule’s complexity and ambiguity have long been reviled and our
European peers have wholly dismissed its viability for solving their own
debt woes.20
The European sovereign-debt crisis, nearly contemporaneous with
the mortgage crisis, imperiled the economies of previously thriving
countries.21 In the wake of the crisis, a group of experts based in Finland

16. Id. (Section 922 of the Act establishes a whistleblower program which pays awards to
eligible whistleblowers who assist the SEC with enforcement actions).
17. See Broome & Markham infra note 47, at 14 (discussing congressional silence on
reforming banking laws prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank); see also Eric J. Spitler, The Long
Game: The Decade-Long Effort to Dismantle the Dodd-Frank Act, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 69
(2020) (“First, the effort expended in so many different arenas in attacking the Dodd-Frank Act
created something of a multiplier effect. For example, congressional letters and hearings elicit
responses that provide fodder for judicial decisions, which in turn generate additional
congressional hearings, document requests and letters This creates a closed loop of constant
attacks on the Dodd-Frank Act. With each attack building on prior attacks, opponents have been
able to delay and alter implementation. These delays often extended until a new line of attack
presented itself.”).
18. One of the few legislative modifications to Dodd-Frank, the Economic Growth,
Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, failed to meaningfully modify Dodd-Frank—
exempting community banks which possess less than $10 billion in assets from the Volcker Rule.
Nevertheless, the Act did modify which bank holding companies (BHCs) are to be designated as
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). See Richard M. Alexander, et al., Passage
of the Economic Growth Act Modifies the Dodd-Frank Act and Provides Other Financial
Regulatory
Relief,
Arnold
&
Porter
(June
1,
2018),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/06/passage-of-the-economicgrowth-act-modifies. (discussing the various changes that the 2018 Act introduced—including the
enhanced prudential threshold for Bank Holding Companies and elimination of supervisory stress
testing).
19. Id.
20. Paul Volcker, himself, said the Volcker rule is “much more complicated than I would
like to see.” Rachel Armstrong, Paul Volcker Says Volcker Rule Too Complicated, REUTERS
(Nov. 9, 2011, 7:54 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-regulation-volcker/paul-volcker-saysvolcker-rule-too-complicated-idUSTRE7A83KN20111109.
21. See Federico Fabbrini, The Euro-Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the Political
Process in Comparative Perspective, 32 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 64, 70–72 (2014) (discussing the
origins of the European sovereign-debt crisis in 2009 and providing a timeline of the events that
precipitated various European nations’ adoption of banking reforms); see also Jeffery Atik, EU
Implementation of Basel III in the Shadow of Euro Crisis, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 283, 293
(2013) (referring to the European Union’s adoption of Basel III reforms, which served as
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also released the Liikanen Report.22 Similar to the Dodd-Frank Act, the
Report disavowed universal banking, and proposed a series of
regulatory reforms that would compartmentalize risky trading
activities and allow banks to enter bankruptcy without requiring a
government bail-out.23
Likewise, in 2011, the Independent Commission on Banking in the
United Kingdom released “The Vickers Report,” which specified
recommendations for its own banking reforms including a ring-fencing
operation imposing similar barriers between retail “utility” banking
from investment banking and corporate finance activities.24 At a glance,
ring-fencing separates high street banks from investment banks,25 but in
reality, the proposition involves a series of requirements. Ring-fenced
banks must establish a completely separate legal entity within their
corporate group structures to insulate safer retail banking operations
from riskier trades. Such separation ensures continuous banking
services by ring-fenced banks in the event of broad failure of financial
institutions.26

Europe’s direct response to the European sovereign debt crisis). Basel III, adopted in 2009, and
the Dodd-Frank Act, originally published in 2010, served as Europe and the United States’
respective responses to their shared economic woes. Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
Volcker Rule, is specifically at issue here. Comparatively, the Volcker Rule was adopted in 2014
after years of bipartisan discussion on how to curb short-term proprietary trading of securities,
derivatives, and commodity futures.
22. Erkki Liikanen et al., HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON REFORMING THE STRUCTURE
OF THE EU BANKING SECTOR (2012), available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/liikanenreport_en [hereinafter LIIKANEN REPORT].
23. Id. at iii. Universal banking, a system adopted by Switzerland, Germany, the
Netherlands, and other European countries, provides a wide variety of comprehensive financial
services, including banking activities in the retail, commercial, and investment sectors. Id. at 42.
Likewise, universal banking has been adopted in the United States—with banks providing
commercial and investment services. See id. at 84–85 (discussing the Glass-Steagall Act’s
mandated separation between commercial and investment activities and Gramm Leach Bliley’s
subsequent modernization of the banking sector, permitting the combination of such activities).
24. INDEP. COMM’N ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS 9–12 (2011),
available
at
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20120827143059/http://bankingcommission.in
dependent.gov.uk/ [hereinafter VICKERS REPORT].
25. High street banks include Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS), Lloyds Bank,
and HSBC. Akin to the term, “Main Street,” which is commonly accepted in the United States,
high street banks are everyday banks for typical consumers of financial services. High street banks
provide retail banking services to individuals and small- to mid-sized businesses and those seeking
loans or liens. Comparatively, investment banks provide banking services to larger institutional
entities and charge service fees for complex transactions, including mergers and acquisitions and
bond issuances. Examples of UK investment banks include Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan.
26. See generally MATTHIAS LEHMANN, LSE LAW, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY WORKING
PAPERS 25/2014, VOLCKER RULE RING-FENCING OR SEPARATION OF BANK ACTIVITIES:
COMPARISON OF STRUCTURAL REFORM ACTS AROUND THE WORLD 2 (2014) [hereinafter
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In an effort to increase competition and limit certain financial
institutions’ ability to capture a disproportionate share of banking
activities, the Vickers Report proposed capitalizing on the divestment
of Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Groups to create a new
bank.27 The proposed banking reform’s paramount goal was to increase
transparency and accountability of financial institutions by heightening
their oversight. Yet, the drastic reduction in the number of serious
competitors within the industry minimized banks’ inclination to
increase accountability.28 The UK government unilaterally accepted all
of the proposals with only one exception.29 The government agreed to
ring-fencing, depositor preference, specific equity requirements to
forge greater separation between high street and wall street, and
measures for improved competition, but it did not accept the
recommendation regarding the divestment of Lloyds Banking Group.
The government argued that such divestment would invariably involve
violating European Commission competition laws.30 While the
European Union’s banking regime is more tightly regulated due its
centralized structure,31 the regulatory framework can still be imported
to the US system.32 While this Note does not endorse adopting a
LEHMANN] (describing the complexities of ring-fencing provisions); see also John Vickers,
Consequences of Brexit for Competition Law and Policy, 33 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y S70,
S70 (2017) (noting that Brexit significantly complicated installation of any ring-fencing provisions
because regulators in both the United Kingdom and European Union are still grappling how to
review international mergers and competition law). These laws were once completely overseen
by the EU’s regulators. To OCC and SEC regulators’ chagrin, such Brexit-related complications
cannot be used as any formidable excuse here.
27. VICKERS REPORT, supra note 24, at 16.
28. Id. at 7; see also Kent Matthews et al., Competitive Conditions Among the Major British
Banks, 31 J. OF BANKING & FIN. 2025, 2027 (2007) (describing the trend towards consolidation
and diversification among UK banks which engaged in acquisitions and demutualizations—
reducing the amount of banks in the industry).
29. See generally Barnabas Reynolds, The Vickers Report and the Future of UK Banking,
Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (March 29, 2012) (discussing the various
proposals set forth in the Vickers Report and the UK government’s response).
30. Id.
31. See generally EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, ECB’s In-Depth Review Shows Banks Need
to
Take
Further
Action
(November
4,
2014),
available
at
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr141104.en.html.
Single
Supervisory
Mechanism, an oversight function of the European Central Bank, serves as the primary authority
for supervising banks. The ECB directly supervises the larger banks and indirectly oversees the
smaller banks. The European Central Bank oversees significant banks—with 119 entities holding
over 82 percent of the assets of the European banking sector. The second pillar is a Single
Resolution Mechanism—a self-financed agency with members appointed by the EU Council.
32. The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), established in 2014 after the
Eurozone crisis, provides “comprehensive and effective arrangements to deal with failing banks
at national level” and “cooperation arrangements to tackle cross border banking failures.” This
bank resolution employs the proposed bail-in mechanism to ensure that both banks and creditors
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centralized banking regime or any banking directives, it does propose
a series of lockstep modifications to current oversight provisions.
The Vickers Report and Liikanen Report provide fertile ground for
a series of reforms for United States banking— reforms that increase
the chance for resolution and creditor bail-in.33 This Note will use these
two reports as guideposts for reform—adopting and modifying core
provisions of both reports to provide banks with a platform for
increased oversight over rogue traders. Although this Note finds that
the blanket separation of commercial and investment banking activities
intrinsic to the Volcker Rule does not serve banks or consumers well;
Threshold separation of banking and trading activities with an
embedded bail-in mechanism will assist both banks and regulators
from major losses stemming from speculative trades. Establishing a
threshold for maximizing capital and liquidity can prevent crises in
which proprietary trading activities “gone wrong” once again threaten
to collapse the market. Part I will explore the evolution of banking
regulations within the United States. Part II will address why the
Volcker Rule fails to thwart illicit banking activities. Part III considers
the European Union’s proposals and whether their implementation
would be compatible with United States’ securities law. Part IV
proposes using bail-in debt instruments to assist with the separation of
‘speculative activities’ from deposit-related and customer-oriented
activities. Part V suggests a need for internal controls to ensure that
agents are accountable within large financial institutions. Last, Part VI
considers the public policy benefits of demystifying banking law by
reforming the Volcker Rule. European peers have not shied away from
such reforms—neither should the United States.
remain accountable to shareholders. If this bail-in mechanism proves inadequate, the BRRD, set
forth parameters to ensure that there be “orderly resolution” for failing banks. The BRRD
includes rules to set up a national resolution fund that must be established by each EU country.
All financial institutions must contribute to these funds. The contributions are calculated based
on institution size and risk profile. In contrast, various agencies oversee the United Stating
banking system—including the Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Scheme, and
Securities and Exchange Commission. The Federal Reserve provides the broadest oversight by
analyzing the safety and stability of financial institutions. This agency is most akin to the BRRD
with its centralized framework. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is funded by
premiums paid by banks and small financial institutions—guaranteeing depositor accounts up to
$250,000 at any of its member banks. EUROPEAN COMMISSION: FINANCIAL STABILITY,
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND CAPITAL MARKETS UNION, Bank Recovery and Resolution (Apr. 30,
2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/financialsupervision-and-risk-management/managing-risks-banks-and-financial-institutions/bankrecovery-and-resolution_en.
33. VICKERS REPORT, supra note 24, at 13; see also LIIKANEN REPORT, supra note 22, at iii
(recommending that banks have resolution plans and use bail-in instruments).

SEREIX_FINAL_12.26_FINAL_SEND (DO NOT DELETE)

84

12/26/2021 11:57 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 17

I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BANKING REGULATION
This section will explore why the US banking system is ripe for
change through a historical overview of regulatory changes shaping the
interactions between investment and commercial banks. While the
breadth of financial institutions has greatly expanded since the 1930s,
policy reforms have largely involved volleying between complete
separation of investment and commercial banking activities—leading to
confusion among politicians and laymen alike.34 In 2017, then-President
Trump articulated a need for change within the United States banking
system. Speaking on the subject, former President Trump said, “[s]ome
people . . . want to go back to the old system, right? So we’re going to
look at that.”35 Though not completely clear, Trump’s reference to the
“old system” seems to refer to the banking structure established by the
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which completely separated commercial
and investment banking.
Yet, at the same time, Senator Elizabeth Warren crafted a bill
entitled, “the 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act,”36 advocating for an
overhaul of several banking acts.37 Most notably, the Act proposed
restricting financial holding companies from engaging in nonfinancial
activities.38 Likewise, Senator Warren sought to prohibit foreign banks
from engaging in nonbanking activities in the United States and
disallow the national banking association from purchasing or selling
securities, stocks, or other financial products or controlling or holding
any interest in a financial subsidiary.39

34. Jennifer Jacobs & Margaret Talev, Trump Weighs Breaking Up Wall Street Banks,
(May
1,
2017,
10:23
AM),
Raising
Gas
Tax,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloombergquint.com/politics/trump-says-he-s-considering-moves-to-break-up-wallstreet-banks.
35. Id.
36. 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act of 2017, S. 881, 115th Cong. (2017).
37. E.g. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. 1831a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. 1841(k) (1994), International Banking Act of 1978, 12
U.S.C. § 3101.
38. 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act of 2017, S. 881, 115th Cong. §§ 5(c), 4(c) (2017). All of
this to say—banks, stay in your lane. In addition to the 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act, Warren
has been a leading proponent of reigning in rogue traders’ behaviors by introducing legislation,
the Ending Too Big to Jail Act, which makes it substantially easier to investigate senior executives
for fraud.
39. See Press Release, Senators Cantwell, Warren, McCain, and King Introduce 21st
Century Glass-Steagall Act (April 6, 2017), https://www.cantwell.senate.gov/news/pressreleases/senators-cantwell-warren-mccain-and-king-introduce-21st-century-glass-steagall-act.
The bill would create a permanent investigative unit for financial crimes, require big bank
certifications, and mandate judicial oversight of deferred prosecution agreements. As the creator
of the Consumer Protection Financial Bureau, Warren, to Republican lawmaker’s dismay, is
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Senator Warren, however, did not advocate for the same notion of
a return to Glass-Steagall, as President Trump incorrectly implied in
previous statements.40 President Trump, while proclaiming a need for
change, actually implemented policies that ran counter to this
declaration. The Trump Administration modified regulations
pertaining solely to small banks and effectively deregulated them while
ignoring the real problem—what to do with the big banks.41 In response
to Trump’s confusion about the changes inherent in returning to the
“old system,” Margaret Tahyar, a partner at Davis Polk who often
represents these banks, put it wonderfully: “[t]hey all use the words
‘Glass-Steagall,’ but they have nothing in common with each other.
We’re talking about a fish, a bird and a reptile.”42 So, how do we
reconcile these differing conceptions of Glass-Steagall? An analysis of
the historical debate about how much regulation is too much provides
an ideal starting point.
A. The Gramm Leach Bliley Act
Congress’ passage of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act of 199943
repealed Glass-Steagall’s requirement that commercial and investment
banking activities be strictly separated.44 The 1980s and 1990s saw
reforms of the Glass-Steagall provisions—allowing “bank holding
perhaps the most authoritative figure paving the way for reforms—and her proposals have
received broad bipartisan support. In fact, the 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act was introduced not
only by Warren, but also former Senator John McCain (R-AZ), Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA),
and Senator Angus King (I-ME).
40. Matt Egan, Trump Wants to Revive a 1933 Banking Law: What that Means is Very
(May
9,
2017,
2:42
PM),
Unclear,
CNNMONEY
https://money.cnn.com/2017/05/09/investing/donald-trump-glass-steagall/index.html.
41. Jacob Pramuk, Trump Signs the Biggest Rollback of Bank Rules Since the Financial
Crisis, CNBC (May 24, 2018,7:45 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/24/trump-signs-bank-billrolling-back-some-dodd-frank-regulations.html.
42. Id.
43. The Gramm Leach Bliley Act was not the first revision of the Glass Stegall Act. The
Banking Act of 1935 clarified the 1933 legislation by resolving several internal inconsistencies.
These revisions included provisions limiting banks’ dealings in non-governmental securities for
customers and their ability to invest in non-investment grade securities for themselves.
Additionally, the regulations specifying the underwriting processes non-governmental securities
and permissible affiliations with corporations were detailed. The Bank Holding Company of 1956,
the last legislative reform before the Gramm Leach Bliley Act, was imposed a failsafe for the
banking industry after the financial woes following World War II. The law prohibited a bank
holding company from engaging in non-banking activities. This reform is still law today and forms
the basis for the type of supervision endorsed in this Note. After these modifications, the state of
the law remained relatively stagnant—mostly due to partisan division on the issue. It is therefore,
no surprise, that lawmakers remain reticent to engage in an overhaul of banking.
44. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106102, §101(a), 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (codified as amended in scattered-sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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companies [such as] Bankers Trust, Citicorp, and J.P. Morgan to
establish subsidiaries for underwriting and dealing in residential
mortgage-backed securities, municipal revenue bonds, and commercial
paper.”45 The decision catalyzed a period of continued deregulation—
allowing ties to be formed between commercial banks and securities
affiliates.46 Combined with other deregulation measures,47 the Gramm
Leach Bliley Act allowed banks to affiliate with a variety of other
financial service providers—including securities firms, mutual funds,
and merchant banking firms.48 Banks may hold financial instruments if
they illustrate that the trading activities are directed at minimizing risk,
and there is no showing of proprietary trading.49
The challenges in distinguishing between proprietary trading and
market-making activities were unanticipated by the drafters of the
Gramm Leach Bliley Act. When crafting the Act, Congress primarily
intended to “modernize” the financial services industry by providing
limited privacy protections against the selling of private financial
information,50 and end regulations that prevented the merger of banks.
Once these banks merged, enormous amounts of personal data became
consolidated within fewer institutions with the newly vested ability to
analyze and sell personal details of customers.51 To safeguard against
the dissemination of this personal information, the GLBA included
provisions to protect personal data.52 The most consequential effect of
45. Jan Krahnen et al., Structural Reforms in Banking: The Role of Trading, 3 J. OF FIN.
REG. 66, 75 (2017) [hereinafter Structural Reforms in Banking] (alteration in original).
46. Id.
47. See generally Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and
After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 J. CORP. L. 723 (2000) (discussing the evolution of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and Congress’s reluctance to adopt other regulations for financial
services).
48. Mark E. Van Der Weide & Satish M. Kini, Subordinated Debt: A Capital Markets
Approach to Bank Regulation, 41 B.C. L. REV. 195, 211 (2000).
49. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered-sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
50. Shockingly, such information was, and continues to be, sold: including bank balances
and account numbers—which are regularly bought and sold by banks, credit card companies, and
other financial institutions.
51. See Steve Culp, For Banks, Safeguarding Consumer Privacy is More Important Than
Ever, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2020, 10:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveculp/2020/04/16/forbanks-safeguarding-consumer-privacy-is-more-important-than-ever/?sh=43d975c353ef
(discussing the secondary effects of Gramm-Leach Bliley on data privacy).
52. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106102, §§ 501–503, 113 Stat. 1338, 1436–39 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. 6801, 6802, 6803).
“[B]anks . . . must securely store personal financial information. Second, they must advise you of
their policies on sharing of personal financial information. Third, they must give consumers the
option to opt-out of some sharing of personal financial information.” The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, EPIC.ORG, https://epic.org/privacy/glba/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2021).
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the Act for banks, however, was language in the GLBA that permitted
banks to engage and affiliate with securities firms, which was previously
forbidden by the Glass-Steagall Act.53 Likewise, the Act expanded
permissible activities for certain banks. One key provision, the creation
of financial holding companies, authorized eligible bank holding
companies to engage in any activity that is, “financial in nature or
incidental to financial activities,”54 and activities that the Federal
Government defines as “complementary to a financial activity” and do
not pose undue risks to the financial system.55
1. The Net Capital Rule
Over time, the Securities and Exchange Commission began to
weaken the sharp divisions between banking and trading activities once
mandated by Glass-Steagall. First, the SEC loosened the net capital
rule, which specified the bare minimum amount of liquid assets, or net
capital, a firm must hold to ensure the firm has sufficient capital to
liquidate.56 Broker dealer subsidiaries would then house the riskier
debt instruments such as derivatives and mortgages.57 Second, the SEC
required increased reporting compliance from holding companies—
forcing them to report their capital adequacy in a way that was
consistent with international reporting standards and to discount their
53. See e.g., Mitchell Martin, Citicorp and Travelers Plan to Merge in Record $70 Billion
Deal: A New No. 1: Financial Giants Unite, N.Y. TIMES (April 7, 1998),
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/07/news/citicorp-and-travelers-plan-to-merge-in-record-70billion-deal-a-new-no.html. Glass-Steagall followed in the wake of Citicorp attempting to merge
with the Travelers Group, which had itself merged with Solomon Brothers.
54. 12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (2019). The exhaustive list of activities that are “financial in nature”
include: “lending, exchanging, transferring, investing for others, or safeguarding money or
securities, all existing activities approved for bank holding companies as ‘closely related to
banking,’ insuring, guaranteeing or indemnifying against loss, harm, damage, illness, disability or
death, or providing and issuing annuities, and acting as principal, agent or broker for purposes of
the foregoing, in any state providing financial, investment or economic advisory services,
including advising an investment company, issuing or selling instruments representing interests in
pools of assets permissible for a bank to hold directly, underwriting, dealing in or making a market
in securities, and certain merchant banking activities.” The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act: What’s in it
for Banks and Thrifts, FINDLAW FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (Mar. 26, 2008),
https://corporate.findlaw.com/finance/the-gramm-leach-bliley-act-what-s-in-it-for-banks-andthrifts.html Basically, anything related to the Bank could be defined as “financial” or
“complimentary to financial activities. Id. It is not difficult to see how risk managers at banks
could get creative with interpreting this lingo.
55. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B) (2018).
56. 17 C.F.R. Part 240.
57. See Division of Trading and Markets Broker-Dealer Net Capital and Books and Records
SEC.
AND
EXCH.
COMM’N,
Guidance,
U.S.
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdnetcapital.htm (last accessed Oct. 18, 2021) (listing the
plethora of requirements for broker-dealers in the United States banking industry).
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assets for market, credit, and operational risks.58 The SEC had assumed
responsibility of regulating Wall Street’s holding companies, hence
giving them greater latitude to deregulate the industry.59 Previously, the
SEC only micro-managed the broker-dealer subsidiaries within them.
Likewise, broker-dealers and investment banks were limited to a 12-1
leverage ratio prior to the financial crisis.60
2. Leverage
Leverage, the ratio of debt or assets to equity, and leveraging, its
associated practice, allows a business to fund its assets with borrowings
rather than equity.61 Lehman Brothers 31:1 leverage led to their
untimely demise.62 For every $31 in debt, there was $1 in equity63—
leaving Lehman with only a minimal amount of cash set aside for losses
or heavy outflows.64 The over-leveraging primarily stemmed from
Lehman Brothers’ unsavory investments in mortgage-based securities
and imprudent underwriting decisions.65
As the leverage ratio increases and a bank’s equity relative to debt
decreases, banks assume greater risk and take on ever-increasing debt
to fund lending.66 With bail-in mechanisms, the banks would bear the
risk; under bail-outs, the government bears the risk. U.S banks are
subject to a balance sheet leverage ratio requirement—compelling
them to maintain a ratio of tier 1 capital to balance sheet assets at a
minimum level of 4 percent.67 To qualify as a “well-capitalized bank,”
banks must achieve a 5 percent supplemental leverage ratio.68 The more
58. Structural Reforms in Banking, supra note 45, at 68.
59. Id. at 66.
60. See William D. Cohan, How We Got the Crash Wrong, THE ATLANTIC (June 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/06/how-we-got-the-crash-wrong/308984/
(noting the pre-financial crisis cap on leveraging which was ultimately foiled by Lehman’s 33:1
leverage ratio).
61. Karen Berman & Joe Knight, Lehman’s Three Big Mistakes, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept.
16, 2009), https://hbr.org/2009/09/lessons-from-lehman.html.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. In the case of the MBSs, when it was revealed that the assets used as collateral for those
mortgage-backed securities were worth a lot less than they thought, the MBSs became worthless and
Lehman Brothers’ spread went from positive to negative. Id. In balance sheet terms, Lehman
Brothers started with a balance sheet in which they owned more than they owed. Id.
66. See id. (“[T]he bias to use high levels of financial leverage to increase returns, combined
with risky debt-to-equity ratios and upside-only bonuses, was a recipe for disaster.”).
67. DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10809, INTRODUCTION TO BANK
REGULATION: LEVERAGE AND CAPITAL RATIO REQUIREMENTS 1 (2019).
68. Id. Basel III established a 3 percent minimum requirement for the Tier 1 leverage ratio
but did not specify whether the threshold should be increased for large financial institutions. In
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telling figure, the leverage ratio itself, deserves greater attention. While
the SLR indicates a bank is maintaining a strong market position, the
leverage ratio itself is highly misleading.69 Banks like Bear Stearns
masked their true leverage levels with securitized debt and off-balance
sheet devices to conceal their collaterized debt obligations.70 The 2004
changes to the net capital rule enabled this over-leveraging that
ultimately contributed to the 2008 financial crisis.71
In 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission modified the net
capital rule in a variety of ways: instituting risk-based weighing which
reduced capital requirements for A-level securities,72 assuming the
responsibility of regulating holding companies, and requiring holding
companies to change their reporting standards to conform to European
capital adequacy standards—discounting assets for market, credit, and
operational risks.73

2014, the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller released regulatory capital rules
which instituted higher leverage ratios for large banks (effective as of January 1, 2018). Bank
holding companies retaining more than $700 billion in consolidated assets or more than $10
trillion in assets under management must maintain a 2 percent buffer—hence a requirement that
banks maintain 5 percent of liquid capital for its total leverage exposure. Without diving into the
mathematical formulations employed by the FDIC, A high debt-to-equity ratio shows that a bank
is engaging in aggressive financing its activities with debt.
69. See id. at 2 (“In addition, a leverage ratio alone may not accurately reflect a bank’s
riskiness because a high concentration of risky assets could produce a similar ratio as a high
concentration of safe assets”).
70. Cohan, supra note 60 (describing explanations of the 2008 crash involving debt leverage
and the collapse of institutions including Bear Stearns).
71. See John Carney, The SEC Rule That Broke Wall Street, CNBC (Mar. 21, 2012),
https://www.cnbc.com/id/46808453 (“Legend has it that a 2004 change to a rule governing capital
adequacy at Wall Street firms allowed broker-dealers to double their leverage, making them
highly fragile and likely to fail in a crisis.”)
72. See id. (explaining the intricacies of the 2004 amendment and the resulting impact on
Wall Street’s broker dealers).
73. SEC Regulation of Investment Banks: Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, 111th Cong. 3-4 (2010) (testimony of Prof. Erik Sirri, Babson College) [hereinafter
Sirri Testimony]. In response to broad criticism that changing the net capital rule led to overleveraging, Erik Sirri, the former Director of the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets, stated
“[t]he Commission did not undo any leverage restrictions in 2004.” While the SEC rule did
provide flexibility for banks to manipulate their capital balances, Sirri argued that the rule
modifications were not to blame. The five financial institutions which significantly over-leveraged
had actually calculated capital requirements as a percentage of customer receivables, rather than
based on their investments. This argument fails to reach the greater issue—the loosened capital
adequacy requirements led to lax monitoring standards for Wall Street and increased methods
for broker-dealers to conceal their losses. The rule fundamentally changed the way that brokerdealers could calculate their net capital. Sirri admitted this in the same statement. “But the rule
did change the way that broker-dealers were allowed to calculate their net capital; in other words,
it changed the way you calculate the denominator. In fact, Sirri concedes this.” James Kwak, What
Did the SEC Really Do in 2004? THE BASELINE SCENARIO (Jan. 30, 2012),
https://baselinescenario.com/2012/01/30/what-did-the-sec-really-do-in-2004/. While the formulaic
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From 2004 to 2008, Bear Stearns’ leverage went from 12-to-1 in
2004 to 33-to-1 in 2008.74 A 33-to-1 leverage ratio equates to “a mere 3
percent drop in the value of a firm’s assets [which] can wipe out its
equity.”75 Therefore, the risks posed to the bank for lending with such
high leverage were considerable. A minor financial blow to the bank in
a situation in which the financial institution was not over-leveraged
could have minimal consequences.76 Conversely, the high ratio of debt
leveraging combined with an adverse liquidity event could yield
enormous consequences—banks could easily flounder under the
weight of these mounting debts.77
In 2007, the housing bubble burst in the aftermath of years of
predatory lending. As emphasized by leading economist Paul Krugman,
the only element common among the residential and commercial
bubbles—leverage—was to blame.78 Debt leveraging reached new
heights with banks administering funds to unwitting consumers seeking
loans for their homes.79 As banks continued to over-leverage, the SEC
and international regulators only exacerbated the situation—willingly
reducing bank capital requirements that would have otherwise limited
borrowing activities.80 This toxic combination of circumstances and
government laxity led to soaring leverage ratios and unanticipated debt
levels among consumers.81

changes are not relevant to this note, the lack of administrative oversight is—Wall Street is
comprised of traders who are attuned to rule modifications and the ways to manipulate capital
and satisfy unenforced standards.
74. See Cohan, supra note 60 (noting that leverage “went from about 12-to-1 in 2004 to 33to-1 in 2008”).
75. See id. (discussing a theory of the financial impact of increases in leverages).
76. See id. (describing a narrative of the financial crisis that significant increases in leverage
“on the balance sheets of Wall Street firms” left “virtually no margin for error.”)
77. See id. (“In an August 2008 essay in American Banker, Pickard lambasted the 2004
change, which he believed allowed Bear Stearns to incur ‘high debt leverage’ without
‘substantially increasing [its] capital base’” (quoting Lee A. Pickard, Viewpoint: SEC’s Old
Capital Approach Was Tried – And True, 173 AMERICAN BANKER 10 (2008)).
78. See Paul Krugman, Bubbles and the Banks, NY TIMES (Jan. 7, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/08/opinion/08krugman.html (explaining that stock bubble
created risk and that “[b]y increasing leverage that is, [sic] by making risky investments with
borrowed money banks could increase their short-term profits”).
79. Due to the scope of this Note, the intricacies of the residential mortgage-backed
securities crisis will not be explored, yet, it is imperative to note that home buyers had been
permitted to take out mortgages with minimal down payments.
80. See Kwak, supra note 73 (“A major benefit for the broker-dealer will be lower
deductions from net capital for market and credit risk that we expect will result from the use of
the alternative method. . . taking advantage of the alternative capital computation would realize
an average reduction in capital deductions of approximately 40 percent.”).
81. Id.
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Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen and other economists have
posited that leveraged loans and CLOs are unlikely to be the next
catalyst of the banking crisis.82 Though this may be the case, “[b]anks
are counterparties to these nonbanks in all kinds of transactions.”83
Over-leveraging promises to be the fatal flaw in the existing Volcker
framework—nonbanks, including retail entities, can still engage in
proprietary trading activities. Leveraging is a symptom, not the
problem.
B. The Volcker Rule: An Exercise in Overreach
1. Volcker’s Framework
Lawmakers surmised a solution to over-leveraging and risky
trading—more legislation. In 2008, the United States Congress crafted
its answer to the financial crisis—the Volcker Rule. The Volker Rule
represents a futile legislative attempt to reform the banking system.84
In fact, the only three bright-line rules established were the default
prohibitions on banking activities that are clearly delimited in the text:
“(i) banks are prohibited from any ‘high-risk’ asset trading, (ii) banks
are not allowed to engage in any trading activities which might incur
material conflict of interest’, and (iii) all compensation schemes must
be designed to deter proprietary trading.”85 This Note suggests that
Volcker, and the Dodd-Frank Act as a whole, fail the US banking
system with blanket prohibitions on proprietary trades.86 Unlike the
European Union and United Kingdom’s rules that permit trading
activities and deposit-taking activities to be conducted by separate
members within the same banking group, the Volcker Rule prohibits
proprietary trading from being carried out by any of the entities in the

82. Sunny Oh, Here’s Why the Fed and Global Regulators are Ringing the Alarm over
(Mar.
12,
2019),
Leveraged
Loans
and
CLOs,
MARKETWATCH
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-why-the-fed-and-global-regulators-are-ringing-thealarm-over-leveraged-loans-and-clos-2019-03-12.
83. Id. (explaining that “regulators are worried their relationships with nonbank players can
play out in unpredictable ways”).
84. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15
U.S.C.) (amending 12 U.S.C. 1851 to place “prohibitions on proprietary trading and certain
relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds”).
85. Structural Reforms in Banking, supra note 45, at 75–76.
86. See generally Final Volcker Rule Regulations, Flowcharts: Funds, DAVIS POLK (Jan. 6,
2014), https://www.davispolk.com/files/Davis.Polk.Final.Volcker.Rule_.Flowcharts.Funds_.pdf
[https://perma.cc/795Q-RHQH] (providing flowcharts summarizing key prohibitions and
permissible activities under the Volcker Rule).
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banking group.87
2. Volcker’s Market-Making Exception
Congress embedded an exemption relating to “certain market
making-related activities” from the Volcker Rule.88 Such exemptions
must be removed to prevent trading schemes like the London Whale
trades from re-occurring. Even though market-making ensures
liquidity of assets and provides stability to financial markets,89 the
exemption makes the line between proprietary trading and marketmaking itself unclear. The Volcker Rule expressly prohibits banking
entities from engaging in proprietary trading, which occurs within
trading accounts.90 The Rule defines these illegal trades, noting that
their purpose is to, “acquire or take one or more covered financial
positions: . . . principally for the purpose of (1) [s]hort term resale
(2)[b]enefiting from actual or expected short-term price movements,
(3) [r]ealizing short term arbitrage profits; or (4) [h]edging . . . .”91
The Volcker Rule permits market-making related hedging
transactions so long as the institutions engaging in such behavior abide
by a series of requirements.92 While most of the procedural
requirements dictate compliance programs and compensation
arrangements, banking entities can engage in market-making related
hedging if the covered financial position “reduces a specific risk in
connection with related individual or aggregated positions” and is one
of the “permitted risk-mitigating hedging activities as outlined in

87. Id.
88. Id. at 26.
89. See Bryan Settelen, VIII. The Volcker Rule’s Market Making Exemption, 31 REV.
BANKING AND FIN. L. 556, 556 (2012) (“Market making plays an important role in providing
liquidity and stability to financial markets . . . .”).
90. Id. at 558 (quoting Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain
Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846,
68,945 (Nov. 7, 2011) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. pts. 44, 248 & 351 & 17 C.F.R. pt. 255)). The
statute defining “account” considers an “account” a “trading account” if the banking entity holds
a covered financial position for sixty days or less. Conversely, Congress defines a trading account
as an account “used for acquiring or taking positions.” The differing definitions of trading
accounts lay the groundwork for even more vastly dissimilar conceptions of proprietary trading.
The Volcker classifies only principal trading in a trading account as prohibited proprietary trading
while Congress recognized that banking entities must be able to freely engage in client-oriented
financial services and exempted principal trading for specific services.
91. Settelen, supra note 89, at 558 (quoting Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary
Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds,
76 Fed. Reg. 68,846, 68,945, §_.3(b)(2)(i)(A)-(C) (Nov. 7, 2011) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. pts.
44, 248 & 351 & 17 C.F.R. pt. 255).
92. Id. at 560.
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proposed regulations.”93
Nevertheless, while this Note does not find that Volcker’s exception
is especially problematic,94 it does find the 2013 Rule change95 to be a
step in the wrong direction. The 2013 modification removed the
requirement that banking entities that rely on the risk-mitigating
hedging exemption must perform correlation analysis to illustrate that
the risk-mitigating hedging activity demonstrably reduces or otherwise
significantly mitigates the specific risks being hedged.96 The rule also
eliminated compliance requirements, compensation restrictions, and
documentation requirements for the activities of a banking entity with
consolidated gross trading assets and liabilities of less than $10 billion
to qualify for the risk-mitigating hedging exemption.97
3. Volcker’s Compliance Problems
In 2020, the Federal Reserve approved the Trump Administration’s
“Volcker 2.0” that softened some requirements—including simplifying
the methodology for determining which types of trades are permitted
and which are not, and eliminating a 3 percent cap on ownership of a
venture capital fund.98 The revamped rule would also permit banks to

93. Id. at 561.
94. See John Ramsay, Acting Dir., Sec. and Exch. Comm., Div. of Trading and Mkts,
Remarks on the Volcker Rule’s Market Making Exemption (Feb. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Ramsay
Statement] (arguing “[m]arket making is of course critical to the function that broker-dealers
perform in supplying liquidity and helping to raise capital. To me, that means, at a minimum, that
the agencies were tasked with trying to implement the exemption in a way that honors the general
proprietary trading ban, but preserves the public benefit that comes from active participation by
banking entities in supplying liquidity to the securities and derivatives markets”). Ramsay’s
conclusion is correct—market-making is a fundamental element of United States’ banking
activities. It likewise is a core element of banking in Germany, Italy, France and other developed
economies. Their reforms have not touched the issue. Neither should this one. Ramsay’s reticence
to excise the market-making exemption from the Volcker Rule, contrasted with his enthusiasm
for public policy reforms such as hard risk limits on trading activities and increased internal
controls illustrates that these two objectives are not incompatible—lending credence to the idea
that the 2013 reforms were a step in the wrong direction.
95. See 17 C.F.R. § 75.1(b) (2019) (“This part implements section 13 of the Bank Holding
Company Act by . . . establishing prohibitions and restrictions on proprietary trading and
investments in or relationships with covered funds, and further explaining the statute’s
requirements.”); see also Memorandum from the Staff of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res.
Sys. Seeking Approval of the Volcker Rule Regulations to the Bd. of Governors 2 (Dec. 9, 2013)
(on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/board-memo-volcker-20131210.pdf
(describing the requirements of the draft final rule).
96. See Lee Meyerson & Keith Noreika, Finalized Changes to Volcker Rule, Harvard Law
School
Forum
on
Corporate
Governance
(September
12,
2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/09/12/finalized-changes-to-volcker-rule/.
97. See generally id.
98. Jesse Hamilton, Banks Get Easier Volcker Rule and $40 Billion Break on Swaps (4),
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invest in debt-based funds. Volcker 2.0, however, did not respond to the
banking industry’s requests.99 In its letter dated March 2020, Goldman
Sachs Group Inc. pressed regulators to eliminate certain Volcker
provisions that have “restricted our ability to invest in certain incubator
companies that provide capital and ‘know-how’ to startup companies
and entrepreneurs.”100 The Federal Reserve and Trump Administration
failed to respond to such a request.101 The only way to satisfy such a
request is to isolate the trading entity—a proposition unilaterally
rejected by the Trump Administration, but embraced by both the
United Kingdom and European Banking Union.
Volcker was crafted as a response to the high frequency of
proprietary trades and the recent failures of Lehman Brothers and
AIG.102 At nearly the same time as the mortgage-backed securities
crisis in the United States, the European Union suffered a very similar
setback within its own cross-border banking industry. Some banks103
had to go so far as to apply for emergency liquidity aid from the Bank
of England in September of 2007.104 Termed the “Eurozone” debt crisis,
the crisis imperiled the entirety of the European banking structure.105
A prolonged political process ensued to proverbially “rescue”
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal; restore market confidence; and revive
the European banking sector.106 Institutional investors liquidated their
BLOOMBERG LAW (Jun. 25, 2020, 4:56 pm), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/banksget-easier-volcker-rule-and-40-billion-reprieve-on-swaps.
99. Id.; see also Volcker Rule Update: Final Rule Includes New Exclusions from the
Definition of “Covered Fund”, SEWARD & KISSEL LLP (July 28, 2020),
https://www.sewkis.com/publications/volcker-rule-update-final-rule-includes-new-exclusionsfrom-the-definition-of-covered-fund/(describing the impact that the Trump Administration’s
modifications to the Volcker Rule had on various market caps).
100. Hamilton, supra note 98 (noting that Goldman Sachs’ letter was unpersuasive to the
federal government).
101. Id.
102. See Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System,
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. Pol’y 671, 677 (2010) (explaining that “The Volcker Rules would prohibit
bank holding companies and all of their subsidiaries from engaging in proprietary trading” and
listing AIG and Lehman as a “prominent failure of the financial crisis”).
103. See José Vinãls et al., Creating a Safer Financial System: Will the Volcker, Vickers, and
Liikanen Structural Measures Help?, at 21, IMF SDN/13/4 (May 14, 2013) [hereinafter Vinãls
SDN] (naming Northern Rock, Royal Bank of Scotland, Hypo Real Estate-Depfa and the
German Landesbanken).
104. See id. (noting that “[i]n some cases—for example, Northern Rock—leverage was a
function of weaknesses in the definition of capital as subordinated debt took the place of common
equity in large amounts. In others—for example, RBS—it was a function of pre-crisis acquisitions
that resulted in expansion of undercapitalized trading exposures.”).
105. See generally Mark Copelovitch et al., The Political Economy of the Euro Crisis, 49
COMP. POL. STUD. 811 (2016).
106. Id. at 821–822.
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holdings of financial stocks and were reluctant to invest in European
bank shares.107 The Eurozone had encountered the perfect storm of
undesirable financial events—a balance-of-payments crisis, coupled
with the inability to fall back on devaluation, the dwindling financial
stability of many European states within an increasingly globalized
economy, and most importantly high-risk lending and borrowing
practices.108 Having dealt with such a nightmarish turn of events,
European Central Bank members looked for answers. Erik Liikanen,
the Governor of the Bank of Finland and a council member of the
European Central Bank, put forth a proposal carefully crafted to learn
from the past mistakes of the European Debt Crisis and set forth
structural reforms to address the next move for banks deemed “Too
Big to Fail.”109
II. LIIKANEN AND VICKERS AS A BASIS FOR REFORM
A. The Key Provisions of Liikanen
The Liikanen Report, created by a high-level expert group in the
EU, provides structural reforms to make the EU banking sector more
resilient to crises.110 This Note endorses Liikanen’s novel proposition
for separation between proprietary trading and high-risk activities,
without ring-fencing—illustrating how intervention rather than
insulation mechanisms can be effective tools for mitigating risk. The
Liikanen Report’s plan to separate trading activities from speculative
activities, including a bank’s deposit-taking activities, presents an
innovative method for emerging from a debt crisis with strengthened
internal and external controls.111 Under the Liikanen Report’s
proposed division of assets, several investment vehicles would be
strictly separated: “loans, loan commitments, or unsecured credit
107. LIIKANEN REPORT, supra note 22, at 8. “By 2010, many institutional investors had
completely liquidated their holdings of financial stocks and were reluctant to invest in European
bank shares. They considered banks as too complex, insufficiently transparent and with uncertain
future cash flows.” Id.
108. Copelovitch et al., supra note 105, at 817.
109. See LIIKANEN REPORT, supra note 22, at iii (“The Group recommends a set of five
measures that augment and complement the set of regulatory reforms already enacted or
proposed by the EU, the Basel Committee and national governments.”).
110. Id. at i.
111. See id.at 107 (“The restriction of speculative risk-taking and the limitation of the use
of guaranteed deposits to fund or subsidise significant trading activities facilitate the supervision
of the largest and most complex banks within a Single Supervisory Mechanism and facilitate
the closer linking of deposit guarantee schemes by limiting the risks insured by those
schemes.”).
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exposures to hedge funds, . . . SIVs and other such entities of
comparable nature, as well as private equity investments” would be
“assigned to the trading entity.”112 Essentially, Liikanen prohibits global
systemically important institutions, or any financial institution that
maintains a balance sheet with robust assets or significant proprietary
trading activities that cross a predetermined threshold, from carrying
on proprietary trading.113
The United States banking regulatory structure is ripe for change.
Adopting the Liikanen proposal’s core measures to restrict proprietary
trading and other high-risk lending activities could greatly mitigate
rogue traders’ ability to manipulate both investment and retail
activities. The Liikanen Report proposes that:
proprietary trading and all assets or derivative positions
incurred in the process of market-making, other than the
activities exempted below, must be assigned to a separate legal
entity, which can be an investment firm or a bank (henceforth
the ‘trading entity’) within the banking group.114

To best explain the foundational elements of Liikanen and how key
provisions of Liikanen can be applied to the United States banking
system, several forms of separation must be employed. First, the
Liikanen Group proposed that, to address proprietary trading,
speculative trades must be wholly separated from commercial activities.
The Group put forth a threshold-based approach which this Note
endorses.115 This separation would only apply to “big banks”—as big
banks are the only financial institutions with a large enough volume of
trading activities to wield a significant impact on national economies.116
The Liikanen group suggested that the mandatory separation proceed
in two stages. This Note endorses the two-step approach with only slight
modifications. In the first stage, regulators must determine whether a
bank’s assets qualify for separation based on their asset volume.117 The
threshold endorsed by Liikanen articulates that “if a bank’s assets held
for trading and available for sale, as currently defined, exceed (1) a
relative examination threshold of 15-25 percent of the bank’s total
112. Id. at 101.
113. Id.at v.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See id. (providing that “mandatory separation applies to all banks for which the activities
to be separated are significant, as compared to the total balance sheet” and that “the smallest
banks” are exempt).
117. Id.
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assets or (2) an absolute examination threshold of €100 billion, the
banks would advance to the second stage examination.”118 Applied to
the United States, the same threshold— €100 billion in trading assets
or $120 billion—could be used to evaluate whether the bank qualifies
as a “big bank.”119 Though the responsibility of determining whether
banks meet the threshold is vested in the European Banking
Commission, the United States’ counterpart, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, would be responsible for determining whether
that particular bank qualifies for separation. The Liikanen proposal
recommends that once a bank exceeds the threshold, all trading
activities should be transferred to a “legally-separate trading entity.”120
Second, in line with the Liikanen proposal, the legally-separate
deposit bank and trading entity can survive within a bank holding
company structure, but the deposit bank itself must be “sufficiently
insulated”121 from the risks of the trading entity.122 The European
Banking Commission’s threshold-level inquiry can be directly applied
to the United States’ banking infrastructure with the proper oversight
of the Securities and Exchange Commission—doing so will greatly
reduce the burden on regulators to decipher whether speculative trades
are occurring while mitigating risk among small and large banks.
B. Liikanen’s Threshold Level Inquiry for Separation
Liikanen recognizes the significance of maintaining both high net
capital and high liquidity—a challenge for most financial institutions.
Banks, distinctive in that they carry little equity compared to other
institutions, maintain special capital structures that can expose them to

118. Id.
119. See Structural Reforms in Banking, supra note 45, at 14 (discussing the threshold de
minimis rule relating to the absolute size of the bank in terms of assets in its trading book under
the Volcker Rule). The threshold established by Liikanen also establishes 15-25 percent of total
assets as a baseline. LIIKANEN REPORT, supra note 22, at v. For the purposes of this note, and
because volume-based thresholds would be more challenging to apply to US bank regulations,
the trading threshold in dollars is endorsed.
120. LIIKANEN REPORT, supra note 22, at v.
121. Id. By “sufficiently insulated,” Liikanen does not propose that banks be insulated by
ring-fencing. See id. (proposing the insulation revolve around strategic limitations on banks which
meet a high net capital threshold). Even with insulation, the deposit bank and trading entity would
be permitted to operate within the same banking group. See id. (“The legally-separate deposit
bank and trading entity can operate within a bank holding company
structure. However, the deposit bank must be sufficiently insulated from the risks of the trading
entity.”) (emphasis omitted).
122. Id.
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failure.123 Receiving 90 percent of their capital funding from debt,
banking institutions in the United States hold debt “in the form of
transaction accounts, which are payable on demand at par and are
readily transferable by the accountholder to third parties.”124 Thus,
readily transferable accounts create a toxic concoction of highly liquid
liabilities and illiquid assets.125
During the second stage of separation, both the trading entity and
the deposit bank would have to be separately capitalized—requiring
capital buffers could effectively eliminate any risk of bank failure. By
requiring that these two entities be partitioned clearly from one
another, three key advantages emerge. First, separation eliminates
banking groups incentive to engage in risk-taking behavior.126
Historically, banks had “gamed the system” to manipulate the amount
of capital127 they held measured against their risk-weighted

123. See Tim Harford, More equity, less risk, FIN. TIMES (July 1, 2011),
https://www.ft.com/content/5038a3de-a1f3-11e0-b485-00144feabdc0 (“The simplest way to
reduce the risk of a future banking crisis is to force banks to hold more equity.”).
124. Mark Van Der Weide & Satish M. Kini, Subordinated Debt: A Capital Markets
Approach to Bank Regulation, 41 B.C. L. REV. 195, 200 (2000).
125. Id. at 201. Professor Charles Goodhart further draws on the perils of this toxic
concoction, noting that “[l]iquidity and solvency are the heavenly twins of banking, frequently
indistinguishable. An illiquid bank can rapidly become insolvent, and an insolvent bank illiquid.”
Matt Johnston, Revisiting the Lehman Brothers Collapse, MEDIUM (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://medium.com/coinmonks/revisiting-the-lehman-brothers-collapse-fb18769d6cf8.
126. See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, STRUCTURAL BANKING REFORMS: CROSSBORDER CONSISTENCIES AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS; REPORT TO G20
LEADERS FOR THE NOVEMBER 2014 SUMMIT 1, 10 (2014), https://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/r_141027.pdf?page_moved=1 (“Hence the separation measure in German and
French law is motivated by the authorities’ aims of preserving financial stability, protecting
deposits and retail banking against risks arising from certain trading activities, removing conflicts
of interest, and encouraging lending to the real economy. Belgium (not currently home to a GSIB) has undertaken similar reforms.”).
127. See Pam Martens & Russ Martens, Treasury Reveals What J.P. Morgan Was Really
Doing with London Whale Trades, WALL ST. ON PARADE (Jun. 15, 2015),
https://wallstreetonparade.com/2015/06/treasury-reveals-what-J.P.
Morgan-was-really-doingwith-london-whale-trades/ (reporting that regulators turned their attention to opaque capital
relief and undisclosed transactions after the London Whale, which increased showing of net
capital holdings). The U.S. Treasury Office of Financial Research reported:
To see how a bank can structure regulatory capital relief, let’s look at a
hypothetical bank required to hold capital equal to 8 percent of its total riskweighted assets. A relatively safe asset held by a bank might be assigned a 100
percent risk weight, requiring 8 cents of capital for every dollar of the asset. A
riskier loan is assigned a 750 percent risk weight, requiring 60 cents of capital for
every dollar of the asset. A bank’s riskiest assets are assigned a 1,250 percent risk
weight, requiring one dollar of capital to back every dollar of the asset (8 percent
times 1,250 percent = 100 percent).
JILL CETINA ET AL., OFF. OF FIN. RSCH., BRIEF SER. NO. 15-04, MORE TRANSPARENCY NEEDED
FOR CAPITAL RELIEF TRADES 2 (2015), https://www.financialresearch.gov/briefs/files/OFRbr-
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assets.128 Returning to the London Whale trading scandal, J.P.
Morgan’s Iksil and Martin-Artajo opted to engage in a series of illegal
trades that technically satisfied the CIO’s internal risk model test for a
balanced portfolio, yet it failed due to the long positions the traders
took in a highly illiquid market.129 Although the firm’s management
task force concluded that the internal oversight mechanisms were
inadequate— such highly complex derivatives swaps, trades, and
investments would be substantially more challenging with a separate
trading entity required by the Liikanen approach.
Second, separation of the trading entity from the banking entity
prevents losses incurred by the trading entity from trickling down to
the taxpayer and the deposit insurance system. Liikanen endorses this
proposition—noting that “[t]he Group proposes that proprietary
trading and all assets or derivative positions incurred in the process of
market-making, other than the activities exempted below, must be
assigned to a separate legal entity, which can be an investment firm or
a bank (henceforth the ‘trading entity’) within the banking group.”130
This eliminates the primary concern that banks that are “Too Big to
Fail” will result in corporate debts becoming consumer debts. Taxpayer
liability is curtailed by clearly separating the two entities. Third, the
separation stifles any attempt at misallocating lending from deposit
banks to other financial activities.131
C. Separation in Practice
“Separation,” however, can be an amorphous term. Separation has
been used to denote a separation between banking and commerce

2015-04-bank-capital-reflief-trades.pdf.
128. See Carey L. Biron, U.S. Regulators Facing Deadline On Key Rule To Rein In Wall Street,
MINTPRESS NEWS (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.demos.org/news/us-regulators-facing-deadline-keyrule-rein-wall-street (taking a historical approach to evaluate both failed and successful
regulatory reforms aimed at speculative trades).
129. DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES, supra note 2, at 9.
130. LIIKANEN REPORT, supra note 22, at v (emphasis omitted).
131. The Federal Reserve Board has described the intended scope and purpose of its own
authority to approve certain activities as complementary to a financial holding company’s
financial activity in relatively cautious terms, as allowing individual FHCs “to engage . . . in
activities that appear to be commercial if a meaningful connection exists between the proposed
commercial activity and the FHC’s financial activities and the proposed commercial activity
would not pose undue risks to the safety and soundness of the FHC’s affiliated depository
institutions or the financial system.” H.R. 10, 106th Cong. § 102 (as reported by H. Comm. on
Banking & Fin. Servs., Jun. 15, 1999) (internal citations omitted). An earlier House Committee
Report included a similar provision. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-74, pt. 1, at 5 (Mar. 23, 1999)
(proposing various eligibility requirements for financial holding companies).
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activities, a separation between investment and commercial banking,
and a separation of banking from nonfinancial activities. This Note
endorses a separation between specific investment activities
(speculative trades) and nonbanking or commercial banking activities
based upon a threshold valuation of a bank’s assets and a weighted
valuation of risk and liquidity. Separate investment activities can be
divided into four categories: accounting separation, functional
separation, legal separation, and economic separation—each of which
would involve a distinct degree of separation from commercial banking
activities.132 Accounting separation, the lightest degree of intervention,
would require that financial institutions create publicly available
reports about the performance of their various business units.133 Yet,
this form of separation alone fails to resolve the issue; there would still
be an incentive for banks to involve themselves in risky trading and
over-leverage themselves.134 Accounting separation would have no
meaningful impact on intragroup transfers of subsidies by large banks;
however, it would be one step closer to increased accountability of
rogue traders.135
Functional separation, a second intermediate form of intervention,
would allow banking groups to continue to provide services within one
group with some of these activities relegated to “functional”
subsidiaries.136 Creating such a firewall is imperative. Though functional
separation in the context of the European system presents more
challenges than it does when applied to the US banking system, it is
nevertheless an essential step.137 Under no circumstance should a
deposit-taking entity economically support a trading entity.
The passage of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act amended the Bank
Holding Company Act to permit Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) to
register as financial holding companies (FHCs)—a change in
classification that broadened the scope of activities that the Bank could
132. See European Commission Consultation Paper on Reforming the structure of the EU
banking sector, at 7 (May 16, 2013), https://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2013/bankingstructural-reform/docs/consultation-document_en.pdf (outlining divisions originally proposed by
the European Commission; this Note elects to employ four of the six original forms of separation).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 85 (proposing functional separation as a means of prudential regulation and
defining the bounds of this separation: stating that such situation requires that “banking groups
continue to provide a universal set of banking services within one group but [that] some of these
activities would need to be provided by separate ‘functional’ subsidiaries.”).
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engage in with minimal oversight.138As a result, banks—now classified
as FHCs—could engage in securities underwriting and dealing,
insurance underwriting, and merchant banking activities. 139 In contrast,
the European Commission’s 2016 attempt at revamping the regulatory
mechanisms resulted in a requirement that large non-EU banks
establish an intermediate parent company, often referred to as the EU
Intermediate Holding Company.140 The Federal Reserve Board’s
foreign bank organization rules require non-US banks with US nonbranch or agency assets of $50 billion to establish an intermediate
holding company.141
The United States foreign bank organization’s rules are
considerably more rigid than the European Union’s rules regulating
corporate form. The European Union allows the parent company to be
an operating company whereas the Foreign Bank Organization
requires a series of measures to ensure the Bank meets liquidity and
capital requirements.142 It must be acknowledged that due to the
European banking structure’s flexibility, it may be easier to install a
system similar to the Liikanen proposal throughout Europe compared
to instituting such a system throughout the United States. Despite the
hurdles posed by the US banking structure, deposit banks can still be
successfully insulated from the risks of the trading entity if they were
to be re-separated. Liikanen stipulates that:
transfers of risks or funds from the deposit bank to the trading
entity . . . would not be allowed to the extent that capital
adequacy, including additional capital buffer requirements on
top of the minimum capital requirements, would be

138. Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the
Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 1006 (2011).
139. Id. at 1035. While the Federal Reserve is the regulatory body overseeing Financial
Holding Companies, the SEC regulates the problematic broker-dealer subsidiaries behind crises
like the residential mortgage-backed securities crisis. Therefore, the SEC is the appropriate
regulatory body to oversee the stages of separation. See generally U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION: DIVISION OF TRADING AND MARKETS, GUIDE TO BROKER-DEALER
REGISTRATION (2008) (discussing the Exchange Act’s special provisions relating to brokerage
and dealing activities of banks and purview over broker-dealers’ activities).
140. See The New EU Law on Intermediate Holding Companies for Third-Country Banking
&
STERLING
(Mar.
26,
2019),
Groups,
SHEARMAN
https://www.shearman.com/perspectives/2019/03/the-new-eu-law-on-intermediate-holdingcompanies-for-third-country-banking-groups.
141. David H. Carpenter & M. Maureen Murphy, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., R41298, THE
“VOLCKER RULE”: PROPOSALS TO LIMIT “SPECULATIVE” PROPRIETARY TRADING BY BANKS
9, (2010).
142. Id. at 2.
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endangered.143

Such a requirement is imperative for revamping Volcker. The root
of the banking crisis that Volcker sought to purge lies in the indistinct
boundaries between deposit banks and trading entities. With a distinct
separation between these two banking entities, Liikanen and his
colleagues found that regulating the deposit bank and the trading entity
could be easier for federal regulators and would permit “consolidated
supervision.”144
D. Dispensing with Ring-fencing as a Method for Isolation
Retail ring-fencing does not adequately prevent proprietary
trading. Although the conceptual underpinnings of the Vickers
report—involving distinct separation between banking and trading
entities—should be directly applied to the United States banking
structure, the specific ring-fencing measures would likely prove
impossible to implement. Ring-fencing requires a UK bank to establish
a separate legal entity within its corporate group to provide retail and
commercial banking services in the UK.145 Through subsidiarization,
retail banking operations that pose minimal risk are insulated from
riskier financial activities.146 If these banks fail, as they did after the
European Sovereign Debt Crisis and Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities Crisis, ring-fencing would at least ensure that retail banking
services can be continuously provided by ring-fenced banks, with
reduced bail-out costs for taxpayers since only investment banks would
require bail-outs, and lay the groundwork for bail-ins as an effective
resolution tool.147
This Note agrees that capital requirements are necessary to ensure
that banks have enough liquid capital to repay their debts to consumers.
Ring-fencing is another articulation of the separation doctrine set forth
in Liikanen—providing a separate legal entity to carry out retail and
commercial banking services. The United Kingdom’s iteration focuses
on insulating investment activities by creating a separate legal entity

143. LIIKANEN REPORT, supra note 22, at 102.
144. Id.
145. See LEHMANN, supra note 26, at 11 (arguing ring-fencing causes banking groups to be
“broken up into retail and wholesale/investment banking entities.”).
146. VICKERS REPORT, supra note 24, at 10.
147. See Jianping Zhou et al., From Bail-out to Bail-in: Mandatory Debt Restructuring of
Systemic Financial Institutions, at 6-10, SDN/12/03 (Apr. 24, 2012) (setting forth a clear formula
for when bail-ins should be employed to “save” SIFIs).
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that provides both retail and financial services.148
The Vickers Report expressly notes that banks cannot, “structure,
arrange, or execute derivatives transactions, engage in proprietary
trading, originate, trade, lend or make markets in securities, underwrite
the sale of debt or equity securities or provide services to non-EEA
customers.”149 Yet, this is a mere “suggestion” that banks maintain their
autonomy over investment and wholesale divisions. The concept of
ring-fencing parallels the United States’ “swaps push out” requirement,
wherein derivatives trading must be completely squared off from
banking activities.150
The Vickers Report, proposed by the UK’s Independent
Commission on Banking, suggests that there should be secured
exposure within every banking group of up to 50 percent of capital.151
This Note proposes that the remodeled Volcker Rule adopt Vickers’
capital requirements and specific language about risky activities with
only the slight modification that these risky trading activities would be
housed within the separate trading entity that is not necessarily ringfenced. These activities include:
b) any service which results in an exposure to a non-ringfenced bank or a non-bank financial organisation, except those
associated with the provision of payments services where the
regulator has deemed this appropriate; c) any service which
would result in a trading book asset; d) any service which
would result in a requirement to hold regulatory capital against
market risk; e) the purchase or origination of derivatives or
other contracts which would result in a requirement to hold
regulatory capital against counterparty credit risk; and f)
services relating to secondary markets activity including the
purchase of loans or securities.152

Vickers sets forth several safeguards to ensure that ring-fenced
banks are truly distinct entities. Ring-fenced banks are prohibited from
engaging in deposit-taking, a practice of providing overdraft facilities
to individuals and small and medium-sized organizations in the UK.153
148. VICKERS REPORT, supra note 24, at 11.
149. Barnabas Reynolds, The Vickers Report: What the Recommendations Mean for the
Future of Banking in the UK, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, (Oct. 5, 2011)
[hereinafter Reynolds], https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/10/25/the-vickers-report-what-therecommendations-mean-for-the-future-of-banking-in-the-uk/.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. VICKERS REPORT, supra note 24, at 52.
153. Structural Reforms in Banking, supra note 45, at 77.
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These ring-fenced banks would be allowed to provide minimal credit
services such as lending to small banks with little market power.154
Ring-fenced banks are prevented from structuring, arranging, or
executing derivatives transactions or engaging in “proprietary trading,
[as to] originate, trade, lend or make markets in securities, underwrite
the sale of debt or equity securities, or provide services to non-EEA
customers.”155 Vickers does speak to aggregate exposure which takes
an ex-post approach to regulating capital of banks that is deemed
risky.156 Vickers establishes that once ring-fenced, banks must maintain
a standard aggregate unsecured exposure.157 This exposure consists of
the outstanding credit that has been extended to other entities.158 The
greater the credit extended, the higher the risk posed to the ring-fenced
entity.159 Vickers dictates that these ring-fenced banks not extend more
than 25 percent of capital resources after certain deductions (the same
limit that currently applies for third parties under the large exposures
regime).160 The ex-post approach fails to put banks on notice about the
trades themselves.
Although Vickers’ prohibitions are not characteristically different
from those of Liikanen, Vickers retail ring-fencing provides a blanket
prohibition on interactions between these two distinct types of banks.161
In contrast, Liikanen focuses on specific resolution tools to mitigate
risky financial behaviors—and chiefly separates speculative trading
activities from investment activities.162 Vickers does not advocate for
154. See id. at 77. Ring-fencing affects market behavior of small banks. The non-Morgan
Stanley’s and Goldman Sachs of the world have responded quite negatively. Even though ringfencing does not actually separate small banks since they do not illustrate excessive risk exposure,
they do feel spillover effects from large banks’ response to ring-fencing. Large ring-fenced banks
often acquire large market shares in mortgage markets by offering cheap mortgage. To keep up,
small banks must increase the riskiness of their lending. In geographic areas wherein large banks
exert considerable market power, smaller banks reduce their rates on high loan-to-value
mortgages. These imprudent financial decisions have the potential to rekindle the circumstances
leading to the financial crisis.
155. See id. (describing the types of activities that ring-fenced banks are prohibited from
engaging in).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. VICKERS REPORT, supra note 24 at 10–11; see also LIIKANEN REPORT, supra note 22, at
85 (noting that the UK Government proposed that smaller institutions be exempt from the ringfencing requirement as part of a de minimis exemption. These smaller institutions are comprised
of banks with less than £25bn in mandated deposits).
162. See LIIKANEN REPORT, supra note 22, at 107 (“Notably, the restriction of speculative
risk-taking and the limitation of the use of guaranteed deposits to fund or subsidise significant
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the separation of proprietary trading and other trading activities based
upon the percent of assets for sale.163 Therefore, Vickers’ focus on
insulation rather than intervention goes beyond the necessary scope for
restraining speculative activities.164
The UK Government implicitly rejected one of the few intervention
measures stipulated in Vickers.165 UK ring-fenced retail banks are
prohibited from lending to financial companies; this notion of
“separation,” reminiscent of the stages of separation proposed in
Liikanen, was met with hesitancy by the UK Government. The UK
Government Response noted that no suitable definition of “financial
companies” existed, and therefore a definition would need to be
created. Adopting Liikanen’s clearly defined capital requirements and
stated leverage ratios for what is and is not a “financial institution”
mitigates any concern that the same issue would arise if Congress were
to adopt a measure separating trading entities from deposit banks. Such
a de minimis limit is clearly specified in Liikanen.166
If adopted, Vickers’ ring-fencing would also apply to a wider scope
of banks because capital requirements would not necessarily dictate
which banks qualify as large enough to be insulated.167 The absence of

trading activities facilitate the supervision of the largest and most complex banks within a Single
Supervisory Mechanism and facilitate the closer linking of deposit guarantee schemes by limiting
the risks insured by those schemes.”).
163. VICKERS REPORT, supra note 24 at 11.
164. See Reynolds, supra note 149 (noting that for “insulation,” of ring-fenced banks, the
Pensions Act 1995 would likely need to be amended—as ring-fenced banks would need to be
shielded from responsibility for deficits in group pension schemes).
165. See Neil Baker, Breaking the Banks, INT’L BAR ASS’N (Sept. 8, 2016) (arguing that
Vickers deemed complete insulation of these banks as an optimal solution to ensure that banks
did not get a free ride and characterized Liikanen’s intervening mechanisms as too permissive);
see also Sudip Kar-Gupta & Steve Slater, Banks told to boost capital and shield taxpayers,
REUTERS (April 11, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-banks/banks-told-toboost-capital-and-shield-taxpayers-idUKTRE7377OY20110411. Bank share prices certainly
strengthened on news that Vickers was not calling for a forced break-up of banks that were
deemed too big to fail. But Vickers himself believes that the reforms outlined in his committee’s
report are “far-reaching” and “could be transformative.” At the press launch of his findings,
Vickers dismissed suggestions that banks were getting an easy ride. “I absolutely reject any notion
that we bottled it,” he said.
166. LIIKANEN REPORT, supra note 22, at 85.
167. See Barnabas Reynolds, The Vickers Report and the Future of UK Banking, HARV. L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE,
(Mar
29,
2012),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/03/29/the-vickers-report-and-the-future-of-uk-banking/
(“The Vickers Commission had proposed that such banks would need to have primary loss
absorbing capital equal to at least 17 percent across all their global operations. However, the UK
government has stated that so long as such a bank can show that any non-UK operations do not
pose a risk to UK financial stability, the requirement will not apply to those non-UK
operations.”).
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such a de minimis standard is especially concerning.168 Liikanen’s
threshold approach combined with its capital requirements on trading
assets, bail-in mechanisms rather than bail-out mechanisms, and plans
for strengthening banks’ governance and control make it the ideal
platform for US banking reform.
III. BAIL-INS BEFORE BAIL-OUT
Turning unsecured debt into bail-inable debt, bail-ins constitute a
form of reorganization—reorganization, as opposed to liquidation. This
failsafe leaves the institutions’ assets alone while converting debt into
alternative, more dilutable forms.169 A bank bail-in requires a bank to
use the money of its unsecured creditors to restructure their capital.170
The bank then converts debt into equity to meet capital
requirements.171 Resolution proceedings can immediately provide
relief to the bank during a bail-in, meaning expedience is not an issue
during bail-ins.172 Bail-outs require the government—rather than the
bank—to bear the burden.173
Within days, the financial institution’s value will be evaluated as it
responds to the inquiries of foreign regulators.174 Overnight, debt is
converted to equity, subsidiary debt swaps take place, and a receiver
takes over.175 Within days to weeks, the government provides liquidity
support and the bank institutes new governance.176 Throughout the
168. Risky assets, more formally known as risk-weighted assets, determine the minimum
amount of capital that must be held by banks or other financial institutions to reduce the risk of
insolvency. Id. Systematically important banks and “large UK ring-fenced banks” are required to
hold capital of core equity and bail-in subordinated debt of at least 17 percent of their risky assets,
with a lower percent for smaller UK banks. Id.
169. See Joseph H. Sommer, Why Bail-In? And How!, 20 ECON. POL’Y REV. 207, 213 (2014)
[hereinafter Sommer]. (describing the merits of reorganization processes as opposed to
liquidation processes).
170. Id. at 227.
171. Edoardo Martino, Subordinated Debt Under Bail-In Threat, 2 UNIV. OF BOLOGNA L.
REV. 252, 289 (2017) [hereinafter Subordinated Debt].
172. See Sommer, supra note 169, at 214 (“To preserve liquidity and confidence, megabank
resolutions must be very fast. Certain parts of them are over with almost before they start.”).
173. See Subordinated Debt, supra note 171, at 267 (discussing how the government currently
bears the burden in bail-out regimes. Yet, in the Italian banking system, the bail-in system “shift[s]
a part of the resolution burden from bank insiders to the banking system as a whole, via the
National Resolution Fund, realizing a sort of ‘private bail-out’ intervention.”).
174. See Sommer, supra note 169, at 217 (outlining how government regulators and
clearinghouses, intermediaries between the reorganizing institution and the bank, will evaluate
bank liquidity to ensure the potential for long-term stability after the bail-in proceeding
terminates).
175. Id. at 219 tbl.1.
176. Id.
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course of several months, the financial institution is restructured to
position the bank to pay off its secured creditors, while simultaneously
gaining access to public liquidity.177 The financial institution also
undergoes new securities registration and distribution.178 At this point,
the receivership ends.179 The end of the receivership signals the end of
the bail-in process. After the process concludes, restructuring continues.
Liikanen suggests that a layer of subordinate bank debt be created—
wherein banks are prohibited from holding subordinated bonds from
other banks.180 As a result, banks would be forced to issue these bonds,
which transfers risk outside of the banking system.181 Termed a “strict
bail-in system,” Liikanen’s bail-in capital requirements would extend
the bail-in process by staggering the maturity dates of these bonds.182
This strategy ensures that there are no significant one-time refinancing
costs that could lead to a bank run.183 Because banks will not be
permitted to hold their subordinated debt, non-SIBs are well-suited to
assume the responsibility.184 Specialized hedge funds, sovereign wealth
funds, and life insurance companies can be effective administrators.185
In order to meet the enhanced capital ratios required to satisfy
Liikanen’s thresholds, it is suggested that “bail-in” subordinated debt
be provided to these banks to help them meet their increased capital
requirements.186 Banks should be incentivized to avoid the quandary
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 218 (“[The receiver] may replace management (if necessary), do some early
transactions, and possibly alter the governance of the firm. The active part of the receivership
could be over as soon as reliable private governance is in place: a few weeks. Or it could persist
longer.”).
180. Jan P. Krahnen, Rescue by Regulation? Key Points of the Liikanen Report, SAFE POL.
CTR., at 1, 11 (White Paper Ser. No. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Rescue by Regulation].
181. Id. at 12.
182. Id. at 15.
183. Id.
184. Id. (“Life insurance companies, as well as sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, highnet-worth individuals and specialized hedge funds seem to fit this profile in particular.”). This
Note does not agree that high-net worth individuals would be well positioned within the US
banking system to oversee the receivership or bail-in process as a whole. This Note does concur
that Italian and French dignitaries may be satisfactorily responsible to monitor European banks’
bail-ins. It, however, does not impute such faith in wealthy, relatively unrestrained individuals
within the US system.
185. Id.
186. See Sommer, supra note 169, at 219 (“Bail-ins requires two things to succeed in full. First,
there must be enough debt at the parent to credibly fill the consolidated capital shortfall, and the
receiver must be willing to haircut it accordingly. This requires regulation, as discussed below.
Second, bail-in must inspire confidence. For this, adequate capital is necessary, but not sufficient.
A sufficient liquidity backstop is also necessary, as is the cooperation of foreign regulators. But
even these are not sufficient.”).
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that Lehman Brothers had found itself in—being comprised of two
thousand separate legally incorporated entities.187 Discussing the
Lehman Brothers’ collapse, the most notable instance of when a bank
that is “Too Big to Fail” fails itself, Senators questioned a series of
financial and regulatory experts during a Senate Banking, Housing, and
Urban Development hearing. One expert noted that the infamous
bank’s collapse highlighted the need for “an exploration of
mechanisms such as so-called debt bail-in proposals that would help
maintain firms as going concerns without requiring either
governmental assistance or a formal resolution process.”188 Terming the
imposition of “bail-in debt” as a “work [] in progress,” the advisors
noted that adopting bail-in debt instruments can “maximize
cooperation and planning before a possible insolvency and, thus, []
maximize the chances that a distressed firm can be satisfactorily dealt
with internationally.”189 Instituting measures for bail-in debts will
permit standardized methods of ensuring that banks meet capital
standards and do not overleverage. Senator Warner, addressing
members of the Federal Reserve Board, noted politicians’ frustration
that there has been little traction to implement stricter restrictions on
leverage:
We have spoken quite a bit here about capital standards.
Another piece—at least in my process of getting educated
about the crisis—was the leverage rates. If I have heard once, I
have heard dozens of times, you know, Canada made
comments about the fact that their lack of problems because
of their rates on—their restrictions on leverage. There was a
proposal in the House bill to put a restriction on leverage. I
believe the blended rate left it—or the conference report left
it to you all.190

Bail-ins have the power to transfer the responsibility from
taxpayers to depositors.191 In other words, neither the government nor
187. Adam Davidson, Lehman Brothers Thought You Were Dead, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept.
11, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/magazine/lehman-brothers-we-heard-you-weredead.html.
188. Continuing Oversight on International Cooperation to Modernize Financial Regulation:
Hearing on S.111-720 Before the S. Subcomm. on Sec. & Int’l Trade & Fin. of the S. Comm. of
Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 111th Cong. 11 (2010) (statement of Daniel K. Tarullo, Member,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 18 (statement of Sen. Mark Warner, Member, S. Subcomm. on Sec. & Int’l Trade
& Fin.).
191. Randall D. Guynn & Patrick S. Kenadjian, Structural Solutions: Blinded by Volcker,
Vickers, Liikanen, Glass-Steagall and Narrow Banking, in TOO BIG TO FAIL III: STRUCTURAL
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the failed institutions will bear the risk; Rather, the depositors—whose
debts are protected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation—
will absorb the losses collectively.192 On a macro-scale, distributing this
risk among the general population will invariably prevent banks and
financial institutions from increasing the government’s deficit and will
allow banks and financial institutions who face bankruptcy to withdraw
their deposits. Bail-outs must be wholly extinguished from any
statutory framework for “rescuing” the big banks.193 Bail-ins provide
banks with an opportunity to rescue themselves, rather than rely on
outside intervention.
Dodd-Frank prohibits bail-outs by requiring orderly liquidation—
instead of government intervention—while minimally advocating for
bail-ins.194 The Act’s bail-in mechanisms are partly modeled after the
European bail-in system set forth during the Basel III international
reforms.195 Bail-ins, however, as they stand now, only apply to the parent
company.196 They must apply more broadly—as Liikanen’s strict bail-in
requirements instruct. Vickers provides that bail-ins should involve a
layer of subordinate debt, “from which there can be no contagion
amongst banks, [which] represents, by its very nature, a form of nonsystemic risk.”197 All bail-in mechanisms specified in Dodd-Frank,
REFORM PROPOSALS SHOULD WE BREAK UP THE BANKS? 126, 134 (2014).
192. See ALLEN N. BERGER ET AL., BANK BAIL-OUTS, BAIL-INS, OR NO REGULATORY
INTERVENTION? A DYNAMIC MODEL AND EMPIRICAL TESTS OF OPTIMAL REGULATION, at 3
(2018) (using many complex mathematical models to illustrate that bail-ins sufficiently spread
risk).
193. See id. (“However, bail-outs produce somewhat lower social welfare values than bail-ins
if the costs of using and risking taxpayers’ funds and transaction costs of raising and distributing
these funds are incorporated in the social welfare function.”)
194. See id. (creating statutory bail-ins that authorize the Federal Reserve, the FDIC and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to place bank holding companies and large non-bank
holding companies in receivership in the event of bank failure); see also David Branaccio & Janet
Nguyen, No more bail-outs: The lawmakers behind Dodd-Frank say that taxpayers won’t foot the
bill the next time a bank fails, MARKETPLACE (Sept. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Dodd & Frank
Remarks], https://www.marketplace.org/2018/09/19/no-more-bail-outs-lawmakers-behind-doddfrank-say-taxpayers-won-t-foot-bill-next/ (quoting Sen. Chris Dodd and Rep. Barney Frank
remarks on Dodd-Frank Act). The co-authors of the Dodd-Frank act clarify that while there is
no exacting language within the Act itself that says bail-outs are banned, they are completely
incompatible with the provisions included in the Volcker Rule. Id. When asked about whether
another bank bail-out would be possible, Dodd noted, “[n]ot only politically could you not get
away with what we were able to do in 2008, but legally you cannot do it.” Id. Rather the Act
requires that there be “orderly dismantling,” instead of a bail-out. Id.
195. Sommer, supra note 169, at 224.
196. See id. at 207 (addressing how bail-ins “impair[] only the nonfinancial liabilities in the
parent and preserve[] the financial liabilities in the subsidiaries. It therefore preserves the firm’s
liquidity and risk- shifting abilities.”).
197. Rescue by Regulation, supra note 180, at 15.
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including the FDIC’s Single-Point-of-Entry approach,198 or Chapter 11
bankruptcy, wield protection only if the parent company is deemed
insolvent.199 With the current bail-in provisions, the insolvent
subsidiary still remains particularly vulnerable. This is easy if the
subsidiary is solvent. Every dollar that flows from the parent’s creditors
to the solvent subsidiary will increase the value of the subsidiary by at
least a dollar.”200
The Act and this Note are both more concerned with the situation
if a bank is rendered insolvent. Structural subordination, which DoddFrank provides for, only protects creditors if the insolvent parent
recapitalizes the subsidiary.201 Operating within the boundaries of the
Bankruptcy Code, the Dodd-Frank bail-in resolution would require
that the parent first pay creditors of the insolvent subsidiary, rather
than recapitalize the subsidiary itself.202 While it is understandable that
creditors demand they be left in the same or better position than they
would be in the event of bank liquidation,203 the subsidiary may still be
left unable to meet net-capital requirements, rendering the entire
intervention-based approach futile.
There are two principal means of administering bail-in bonds. The
first principle—the hierarchy principle—involves claims with “high
seniority,” which will incur lower losses.204 The second principle—the
equitable treatment principle—allocates expected losses to bail-inable
creditors in a staggered manner wherein creditors of the same seniority
incur the same loss.205 Either approach will provide a valuable means
for issuing bail-in bonds and particular selection of a method is beyond
the scope of this Note. Yet, they must apply to both parent and
subsidiary for the aforementioned reason—the subsidiary’s default is
still a potential outcome even after intervention.206 Bail-in insolvency
198. See THE CLEARING HOUSE ASSN., ENDING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL”: TITLE II OF THE
DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE APPROACH OF “SINGLE POINT OF ENTRY” PRIVATE SECTOR
RECAPITALIZATION OF A FAILED FINANCIAL COMPANY, 8–9, 34–38 (2013) (noting that supports
of the SPOE approach argue that the FDIC will no longer have to heavily borrow from the
Treasury if bail-ins were to be installed among SIFIs).
199. Sommer, supra note 169, at 227.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Edoardo Martino, The Bail-In Beyond Unpredictability: Creditors’ Incentives and
Market Discipline, 21 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. R. 789, 814 (2020) (discussing the varied methods of
administering bonds and their associated risk levels) [hereinafter Bail-In Unpredictability].
205. Id.
206. Id.
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should not be merely a first step before bail-outs. Rather, Liikanen’s
express prohibition on bail-outs should be embraced207—doing away
with the implied language inherent in Volcker’s orderly liquidation
process.208 Likewise, Liikanen endorses bail-in instruments that apply
to both parent and subsidiary, primarily concerned with maintaining
the retail bank that is operating as the subsidiary and houses most
individuals’ assets.209 The report suggests that “[b]anks should build up
a sufficiently large layer of bail-inable debt that should be clearly
defined, so that its position within the hierarchy of debt commitments
in a bank’s balance sheet is clear and investors understand the eventual
treatment in case of resolution.”210
Liikanen also suggests that bail-ins can be used as a compliance
tool. If a bail-in debt instrument must be deployed, executives would
receive lower bonuses or face individual financial consequences. It is
suggested that “[b]ail-in instruments should also be used in
remuneration schemes for top management so as best to align decisionmaking with longer-term performance in banks.”211 A regulatory
structure akin to that of Liikanen must exist so that banks have a means
of reckoning with the burden left by hefty financial liabilities—often
ones created through rogue actors’ proprietary trades. Under
Liikanen’s strict bail-in terms, only SIFIs with the resources to collect
from creditors can avoid redistributing risk to unwitting consumers.
207. See Erikki Liikanen, Governor, Bank of Fin, Chairman, High-level Expert Grp. on
reforming the structure of the EU banking sector, seminar at the Bank of Italy: Too-Big-To-Fail
and a reform of banking structures (Jun. 27, 2014) (“The regulatory initiative, which to date most
directly addresses the too-big-to-fail problem and the assumption that systemically important
banks will be bailed-out by the government, is the recovery and resolution regime. When
successfully implemented, the new tools enable an orderly ‘failure’ of banks. The main tool will
be the possibility to ‘bail-in’ bank debt holders to absorb losses. Substantial social costs can thus
be avoided. Moreover, the new recovery and resolution tools, provided that they are credible,
will reduce the implicit government guarantee and the distortive risk-taking incentives created by
public bail-out expectations and artificially low funding costs.”).
208. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). See
also, Wex, Dodd-Frank: Title II - Orderly Liquidation Authority, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dodd-frank_title_ii_-_orderly_liquidation_authority (“Title II,
the Orderly Liquidation provision of the Dodd-Frank Act, provides a process to quickly and
efficiently liquidate a large, complex financial company that is close to failing. Title II provides
an alternative to bankruptcy, in which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is
appointed as a receiver to carry out the liquidation and wind-up of the company.”).
209. David G. Mayes, Bank Resolutions in New Zealand and its Implications for Europe, in
CENTRAL BANKING AT A CROSSROADS: EUROPE AND BEYOND, 123, 130 (Charles Goodhart et
al. eds., 2014).
210. Tom Burgis, The Liikanen Report Decoded, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2012),
https://www.ft.com/content/0ff0b3a4-0c8a-11e2-a73c-00144feabdc0.
211. Id.
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Under the current Volcker Rule, rogue traders will maintain the
perverse incentive to pay back creditors before consumers. Conversely,
the Liikanen framework puts an end to the ability for traders to set
priorities for payment. Regulators will instead.212
Many countries have modified their banking laws to separate
investment and commercial banking activities while maintaining a
market-making exemption.213 The Liikanen Report acknowledges that
separating market-making from proprietary trading would not be a
fruitful course of action, concluding that prohibition on such activities
is imprudent.214 This Note concurs with Liikanen’s judgment. By
requiring mandatory separation of high-risk trading activities—
including proprietary trading, market-making, and undertaking
unsecured exposures to hedge funds, SIVs and private equity
investments—and permitting these activities to take place in a
separately capitalized and ring-fenced legal entity, the US regulatory
structure can ensure that market-making will not pose substantial
risk.215 Liikanen goes so far as to classify market-making as a trading
activity, rather than as a proprietary trading activity—a classification
that can only be made when globally significant institutions maintain
an infrastructure for separating core banking activities from risky
financial activities.216 As seen in Figure 1, market-making is permitted
under Volcker and Liikanen, but prohibited under Vickers. Ringfenced entities, by their nature, are overly-limiting.217 Liikanen’s
separation is compatible with the market-making exemption and
would be the easiest to implement into the current legal framework for
monitoring speculative trading.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Structural Reforms in Banking, supra note 45, at 79.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 78.
Id.
Id.
See LEHMANN, supra note 26, at 12.
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FIGURE 1

European countries with separate retail and investment entities
have different interpretations of Liikanen’s reticence to conclusively
prohibit market-making, most requiring internal risk limits that are
quantified into “tiers.”218 Vickers also evaluated whether the Volcker
Rule’s prohibition of proprietary trading is needed in a system in which
there are ring-fenced entities.219 Under Vickers, agencies would not
have the authority to bail-out the banks. Ring-fenced entities, the
entities that would ostensibly bail-out the banks would be prevented
from doing so due to their separation. Bail-ins rather than bail-outs

218. Id. at 13.
219. Id. at 11.
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within ring-fenced entities have the potential to render the marketmaking discussion moot. This Note proposes that these bail-in
instruments be deployed in the event of bank-failure. While this failure
would be unlikely in the proposed separated system, it should
nonetheless be an intervention mechanism that is readily available for
banks to implement (see Figure 2).
FIGURE 2

IV. CONTROLLING FOR ROGUE TRADERS
Solely regulating banks via external processes is not enough. In
addition, internal controls must also be heightened to mitigate the
types of rogue trading activities that led to crises like the London
Whale. If separation of trading activities from deposit banking does not
come to fruition, this Note endorses two primary means of coursecorrection. First, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation should reevaluate whether the stock market can actually serve as a source of
discipline for traders. Federal proposals isolating the stock market as
the principal means of reigning in illicit bank behaviors emphasize the
ability of shareholders to pressure bad bank managers to improve share
price and lower cost of capital in the event of an illiquidity crisis.220
Second, banks carry minimal equity compared to other institutions

220. Simon Kwan, Testing the Strong-Form of Market Discipline: The Effects of Public
Market Signals on Bank Risk 2-4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 2004-19).
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due to the asymmetric structure of banks’ assets and liabilities;221
therefore, a lapse in judgment or purposeful evasion of standard trading
practices can lead to a severe liquidity crisis. The continued reliance on
the stock market as a source of market discipline may yield unintended
effects on the behavior of depositors. As seen in Brickner v. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp.,222 the Eighth Circuit noted that in the case of
such a crisis, it is likely that a bank’s depositors will want to withdraw
their money, leading to a bank run.223
If banks remain relatively deregulated,224 with no distinct
separation between investment and commercial activities, the
responsibility for managing risk must be spread between bank
regulators, bank management, and bank shareholders. While many
academics and banking professionals alike traditionally consider
corporate officers to be fiduciaries, holding corporate officers
responsible does not serve as much of a deterrence function as a
regulator would hope. Additionally, corporate officers typically are not
involved in rogue trades. The Board’s investigation into the illegal trade
or loss after the fact may not deter the behavior in the first place. In
Espinoza v. Dimon, the Plaintiff shareholder alleged that J.P. Morgan
adequately investigated only one of the two incidents in the London
Whale fiasco.225 The Board investigated (1) the underlying trading
losses, which cost J.P. Morgan billions but allegedly did not examine (2)
the misleading statements by Dimon and others.226
This Note finds that risk managers, who oversee these proprietary
trades, should have their compensation deflated to typical investment
banking salaries. A Senate report found that Marcis, Martin-Artajo, and
Iksil were all compensated as investment bankers rather than as risk

221. Basel III Capital and Liquidity Standards - FAQs, Moody’s Analytics (2013),
https://www.moodysanalytics.com/-/media/article/2013/2013-18-10-basel-iii-capital-and-liquiditystandards-faq.pdf (noting that the Basel III accord raised the minimum Basel III capital
requirements for banks from 2 percent in Basel II to 4.5 percent of common equity, calculated as
a percentage of the bank’s risk-weighted assets. An extra 2.5 percent buffer capital requirement
also is embedded in Basel III’s capital requirements—including 4.5 percent common equity
requirement, plus 2.5 percent capital conservation buffer, plus 2.5 percent counter-cyclical capital
buffer).
222. See Brickner v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 747 F.2d 1198, 1202 (8th Cir. 1984) (discussing
bank depositors’ chance to withdraw their deposits simultaneously in the event of a prospective
market failure).
223. See generally id.
224. Deregulation describes the general reduction in government oversight over the banking
industry and increased self-authority over internal policing within banks.]
225. Espinoza ex rel. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. v. Dimon, 797 F.3d 229, 231 (2d Cir. 2015).]
226. Id. at 236.
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managers.227 The Report observed that “not only were the SCP
employees compensated like Investment Bank employees, but they
were compensated at levels that were at the top range of, or better than,
the best Investment Bank employees.”228 Therefore, incentive-based
compensation for risk managers who handle risky derivatives must be
eliminated, destroying any desire for one of the factors that would lead
to financial reward from influencing these individuals.229 In In re J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co. Securities Litigation, another case rifling with the
London Whale trades, the Court noted that J.P Morgan had
misrepresented the risk management activities of the Chief Investment
Office and that “Dimon had ‘secretly transformed the CIO from a risk
management unit into a proprietary trading desk whose principal
purpose was to engage in speculative, high-risk bets designed to
generate profits.”230 Risk-taking is exactly what this proposed
structural form seeks to limit. Rogue trades will be severely curtailed
when the management required to execute these trades is incentivized
to respond and report rather than to turn a blind eye.
V. ELIMINATING THE AMBIGUITIES
The Volcker Rule’s ambiguities can be effectively eliminated
through this proposal. The separation of proprietary trading from
deposit banks makes distinguishing between ‘proprietary trading’ and
‘trading account[s]’ virtually pointless. The Volcker Rule expresses that,
“proprietary trading under the Rule concerns ‘engaging as a principal
for the trading account of [a] banking entity,’ and trading accounts refer
to ‘any account used for … taking positions in the securities and
instruments described in the Act’s definition of proprietary trading.’”231
This “purpose test” distinguishes between what is and is not a
“trading account.” Yet, the purpose test has been found to be extremely
complex. For example, what constitutes “taking positions” and what are
the “instruments” for selling that are prohibited? In contrast,
227. Id.
228. STAFF OF THE PERMANENT S. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., REP. ON
J.P. MORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES
59 (Comm. Print 2013), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report-J.P. Morgan-chase-whaletrades-a-case-history-of-derivatives-risks-and-abuses-march-15-; see id. at 9 (observing that the
public first learned about the whale trades on April 6, 2012).
229. See Jill E. Fisch, The Mess at Morgan: Risk, Incentives and Shareholder Empowerment,
83 U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 677 (2015).
230. In re JP Morgan Chase & Co. Sec. Litig., 12 Civ. 3852, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44050 at
*8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) (citing Compl. ¶ 5).
231. 17 CFR § 255.3.
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Liikanen’s threshold-based inquiry navigates around such ambiguities
by initially determining whether separation between proprietary
trading activities and other activities is necessary. When discussing the
Volcker Rule’s intrinsic complexity, Democratic Senator Heidi
Heitkamp stated, “it is my experience that when a rule’s too
complicated, there isn’t much compliance, so it doesn’t really get you
what you need.”232 As evidenced by a considerable amount of
complaints filed regarding the rule, those who are responsible for
complying have historically been unable to understand how to linedraw between illicit proprietary trades, legal trades, and marketmaking.233
CONCLUSION
The London Whale, Subprime Mortgage Crisis, and European
Sovereign Debt Crisis all shared two elements in common: banks that
overleveraged and the comingling of retail and investment
infrastructures. A lack of regulatory oversight enables these
behaviors—spurring speculative trades and the need for government
bail-outs, which proved costly to taxpayers following the 2008 financial
crisis. Volcker does not prevent the occurrence of speculative trades.
Likewise, its complexity has confused lawmakers and the public alike
while providing traders with a route for skirting regulation. While
Congress, and this Note, have considered Vickers’ concept of ringfencing and found it to be too limiting, legislative bodies have failed to
consider a threshold-based approach that would require banks by law
to maintain a minimal level of net capital and liquidity in the event of
bank failure. This Proposal, after a careful consideration of the merits
of Vickers, Volcker, and Liikanen finds that Liikanen’s bail-in debt
instruments and threshold separation of speculative trading from other
financial activities coupled with increased restraints on rogue traders
would vastly curtail illicit banking activities. The system is ripe for
change. This framework provides fertile ground for increasing
accountability for banks and the rogue traders within these institutions.
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